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FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN JAPAN* 
by 
Hugh T. Patrick 
Yale University 
I. Introduction 
This paper presents some preliminary ideas and data on the role of finan­
cial intermediation in postwar economic growth in Japan. The approach here 
is essentially empirical: to present past aggregate flows and to determine, 
or at least to hypothesize about, some of the important behavioral and in­
stitutional relationships of the Japanese financial system. My presumption 
is that Japanese financial intermediaries have in fact participated impor­
tantly in attracting savings, in facilitating private business fixed 
investment, and in allocating among alternative investment uses. 
There are two general approaches to the appraisal of a financial 
system: micro.analysis of individual financial institution units, ex­
tending to homogeneous groups of financial institutions (such as the 
theory of commercial bank behavior, and of the banking system); and macro­
analysis of the system as a whole. To understand the relationship be:­
tween real and financial variables for the process of economic growth 
both methods are desirable; research should proceed interactingly at both 
macro and micro levels, each moving toward the other. The approach here 
* Presented at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research, Seventh Zeshi 
Conference, Zushi, Japan, January 1969; revised July 1969, to be pub-
lished ,:,r- Japanese) in the forthcoming volume on the Con£erence proceedings~ 
-2-
is essentially aggregative--an appraisal of the entire financial system-­
though to some e~tent various categories of financial institutions and 
financial instruments are treated. 
II. Alternative Sources for Financing Investment 
We must admit frankly that our theoretical tools for empirical analysis 
of the dynamic process of economic growth in real world economies are still 
weak. When we consider the implications of external economies and diseco­
nomies, input-output relationships, public goods, and of not-well-specified 
possibilities of technological change, it becomes more difficult to deter­
mine in much detail what constitute efficient or inefficient investment 
allocations for growth, and to appraise the efficacy of actual allocations 
in a given historical experience of a country's growth. Nonetheless, some 
sorts of broad conclusions can emerge. These difficulties are magnified 
when the relationship between finance and growth is analyzed; here too 
our theoretical tools for empirical application are still weak, despite 
recent advances in the theory of portfolio selection by Tobin and others, 
and in the theory of financial structures by Gurley and Shaw, and Gold­
smith. That literature, and the emphasis here as well, focuses on the 
impact of finance on saving and investment, excluding other possible im­
pacts on growth-causing forces. 
The first step in evaluating the role of financial intermediation is 
to appraise how important it actually is relative to the alternative 
means of financing investment. The various mechanisms include: private 
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self-finance from saving; government taxation and saving to finance govern­
ment or private investment; the market-oriented financial technique of 
assets and debts based on, and encouraging, the separation of saving (and 
wealth) and investment (and the management of wealth); and reliance on 
foreign sources. Each device has its own merits and defects; frequently 
all are used simultaneously, intermingling real and financial assets and 
claims; empirically it is difficult to determine social trade-offs among 
them. 
Self-finance without supplement by external borrowing or lending is 
inefficient: it unduly restricts the investment of efficient entrepreneurs; 
the pattern of investment is almost certainly less than optimal; the in­
centive to save for the wide range of savers with limited investment op­
portunities is reduced, outweighing probably the increased saving incen­
tive for those who want to invest more. Saving through government taxation 
(or de facto taxation by inflation), because of its involuntary, non­
market nature, may have political limits in a democratic society, as well 
as disincentive effects on private saving. Foreign borrowing can be an 
important supplementary source, particularly for an economy suffering a 
balance of payments constraint on growth, but may also have high political 
costs. The financial intermediation mechanism may have defects too: 
markets may be imperfect; financiers may be unduly conservative, willing 
to take less risk than socially desirable, or allocating to socially non­
optimal projects. 
Any spending unit (defined as a purchaser of real goods and services) 
can have four activities: saver, investor, lender, borrower. On a gross 
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basis spending units frequently engage in all four. On a net basis, how­
ever, they are only net savers or net investors, i.e., surplus or deficit 
spending units. The net lending-borrowing activity, while in one sense a 
mirror image of the net saving-investing activity, is not that alone because 
spending units usually have independent reasons for wanting financial flows 
as well as real flows--i,e., to increase financial assets as well as real 
capital. 
In macro-analysis we face the dilemma between the need to aggregate 
and the loss of information as inter-unit transactions cancel out in the 
process of consolidation. This has been a problem for finance both in 
theory and practice. Frequently macro-analysis at the most aggregative 
level forgets finance altogether, simply equating ex post (and sometimes 
~ ante) saving and investment, ignoring the alchemy by which the one is 
transmuted into the other. This difficulty can be met in part by combina­
tion rather than consolidation, by not netting our inter-unit or inter­
sectoral flows. A practical problem is that one must work with available 
data, relying frequently upon the aggregated estimates provided by offi­
ciaL and other sources. 
The estimation procedure in this essay is to aggregate.domestic spend­
ing units into three sectors, government, private corporate business, and 
1
the personal sector. In addition there is a domestic financial sector 
(which for our aggregative purposes is not defined as a spending unit). 
The rest-of-the-world sector enters the financial data only. This sec­
toring is determined essentially by the limitations of Japan's national 
1A more detailed discussion of estimation methods and sources appears 
in the appendix on data. 
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accounts and flow of funds data. The government sector includes central and 
local government and government corporations; it excludes government finan­
cial institutions, which are included in the financial sector. Given the 
degree of centralization of government decision-making in Japan it is not 
unreasonable to regard the government sector as relative homogeneous. The 
corporate sector is somewhat less so; the most important heterogeneity, in 
terms of finance, is the differential access to the financial system of 
large and small firms, or firms of different degrees of risk. Unsatisfyingly 
heterogeneous is the personal sector, including as it does farmers, other 
unincorporated enterprises, wage-earners, capital-share recipients, and 
self-employed professionals--each presumably with somewhat different saving, 
investment, wealth, and portfolio composition goals and differential bor­
rowing access to the financial system. Under present data collection methods 
it is difficult to divide this sector further, particularly on the financial 
side. 
The three spending sectors do all the saving and investing in the do­
mestic economy. As is discussed below, they utilize to one degree or 
another all the mechanisms for financing their investment. They need funds 
not just to finance their own investment, but also to maintain or enhance 
their own liquidity (relative to real capital), and to support the expendi­
tures of other spending units. To obtain funds they issue primary claims-­
2
i.e., borrow by stock or bond issue, loans, etc. All their liabilities 
(excluding retained earnings and earnings-related reserves) are in prin­
ciple their primary liabilities, held as primary assets by other spending 
21 use the standard Gurley-Shaw terminology in referring to primary 
and indirect claims. 
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units and by the financial system. The financial sector's liabilities (money, 
time deposits, insurance, etc.) are entirely classified as indirect claims, 
including their stock issue. Thus, though both the financial sector and 
the spending sectors can hold both primary and indirect assets, only the 
financial sector can issue indirect liabilities and only the spending sec­
tors can issue primary liabilities. The rest-of-the-world sector's assets 
and liabilities, in relation to Japan, are regarded by convention as primary 
securities (the sole exception to the rule that the financial sector cannot 
create primary liabilities). 
Table 1 provides data on the relative importance of alternative sources 
of the financing of investment for the three spending sectors for the period 
1954-1967. It is a sources and uses flow accounting. Annual savings and 
investment flows have been cumulated, and the net change in financial assets 
and liabilities outstanding between December 31, 1953 and December 31, 1967 
estimated. (This understates the effect of finance because the issuance of 
primary and indirect claims is net of retirement of such claims during the 
period). Indirect claims are, slightly underestimated because intrafinan­
cial sector claims are somewhat netted out in available flow of funds data. 
A number of conclusions, many well known, are supported by the data. 
First, the total increase in primary debt between 1954-1967 equalled 
the cumulated gross investment for the period. This is a high ratio as 
compared with other countries. 3 Similarly in stock terms Japan has a high 
3For international comparisons see Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Deter­
minants of Financial Structure (Paris: Development Centre, OECD, 1966), 
and his Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1969). That the ratio in Japan is almost unity is a curious 
coincidence, for which I have no explanation. 
Table 1 
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS BY SPENDING SECTOR, 1954-1967 
(billion yen) 














Internal-Gross Domestic Saving 32,589.1 
Net Saving 12,117.2 
Capital Consumption Allowances 20,471.9 
External-total 67,546.3 
Primary Security Issue 67,546.3 
Stock Issue 6,698.3 
Bond Issue 2,069.4 
Loans-domestic 33,663.7 
Loans-foreign 2,021.6 
Trade Credit 22,599.1 
Other 494.2 
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Note: Primary assets differ from primary liabilities by the difference in foreign loans, since the 
rest-of-the-world sector is excluded; similarly saving differs from investment, due also to 
statistical discrepancies in estimation. 
Sourc~:.. See Appendix, -on ,.-Data..-. · . • • • 
I ..... 
I 
Table 1 (continued) 
Corporate Personal Government Financial Total Domestic 
Sector Sector Sector Sector Economx_ 
(F) Indirect Claims 17,683.7 34,850.6 3,742.3 9,672.8 65,949.4 
Money 5,925.8 6,777.5 336.6 525.0 13,564.9 
Time and Saving Deposits 8,417.6 17,411.2 479.6 212.2 26,520.6 
Trust 736.2 2,237.3 28.1 143.8 3,145.4 
Insurance 0 4,975.3 0 0 4,975.3 
Bank Bonds 271.2 1,294.3 0 2,269.4 3,834.9 
Securities Investment Trust 17.8 795.8 0 51.3 864.9 
Stock and Equity in 
Financial Institutions 339.9 444.0 316.6 0 1,100.5 
Other 1,975.2 915.2 2,581.4 6,471.1 11,942.9 
Total 99,024.8 59,115.9 30,469.4 67,442.4 256,052.5 





ratio of primary securities to real national wealth. The financial 
interrelations ratio (the ratio of all financial assets--both primary and 
indirect securities--to real national wealth) is also very large, at a level 
shared only by England (a legacy of its government war debt) and Switzer-
, 
land (as international financial intermediary). About 70 percent of the 
increase in Japanese primary debt was issued by corporate business, and only 
slightly over 10 percent by the government sector. 
Second, the foreign sector has been unimportant either as a source of 
financing of domestic investment or as a use of domestic saving. The small 
influence of foreign financing is true for each of the spending sectors, and 
for the financial sector too. This is not inconsistent with the view that 
foreign borrowing has been important for Japan's postwar growth by easing 
the balance of payments constraint, or significant for certain firms or in­
dustries. 
Third, the taxation method of accumulating saving has been of some im­
portance, accounting for almost one-fifth of gross saving and almost one­
third of net saving. While substantial, these ratios are not unusual; for 
example, they are higher in France and West Germany. The presumption is 
that government saving has been used virtually entirely to finance govern­
ment investment--in large part directly but to some extent also by the 
transfer of government sector saving to government financial institutions 
to be lent to government sector institutions. Typically the central govern­
ment saves enough to finance more than its own investment, transferring the 
remainder by a bewildering variety of routes to finance (part of) the ex­
cess investment of local governments and public corporations. Thus the 
-10-
taxation mechanism has financed about four-fifths of government sector in­
vestment, but none of the economy's private investment. Rather government 
financial institutions (part of the financial sector) issued indirect 
liabilities (mostly postal savings deposits and life insurance) to private 
spending sectors, and lent to all three spending sectors. 
Fourth, self-finance by capital consumption allowances has been sub­
stantial, amounting to one-third of gross investment (and gross saving) for 
the economy as a whole and to more than 40 percent of the corporate sector's 
gross investment. As in the United States and West Germany, Japanese cor­
porate depreciation is almost double its net saving by retaining profits. 
Though capital consumption allowances were about the same proportion of GNP 
in the early 19S0's as in the United States, the ratio in Japan has sub­
sequently increased substantially (from 7.0 percent of GNP in 1952 to 12.8 
percent in 1967). While Japan's depreciation laws are somewhat more lenient 
than in the United States, the main reason for the increase in the ratio has 
been the continuing surge of private fixed investment. 
Fifth, trade credit has been large--30 percent of total primary security 
liabilities and 33 percent of corporate sector borrowing. Significantly, 
the increase in trade credit was more than 2 1/2 times as great as corporate 
investment in inventories (and a substantially larger multiple in the case 
of the personal sector, mainly for unincorporated business). Trade credit 
has been used in Japan not simply to finance inventories, but also for 
fixed investment and the increase in financial assets. 
While foreign financing can be dismissed as unimportant and financing 
by taxation, while not trivial, relegated to the government sector, it is 
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much more difficult to determine the relative importance of self-finance and 
of financial intermediation. For the economy as a whole saving necessarily 
equals investment, 4 which tends to obliterate the real importance of finan­
cial intermediation. On the other hand, Japan has had a very large increase 
in spending unit primary liabilities. As a first approximation, the range 
within which a sector's investment has been financed internally or exter­
nally can be estimated by making the following two hypotheses which deter­
mine the upper and lower limits: savings are used entirely for self-finance 
of investment, and any excess in investment and increase in financial assets 
is financed by borrowing (issuance of primary liabilities) or, savings are 
used first to reduce primary liabilities and to increase financial assets, 
while investment is financed out of new borrowing (issuance of primary 
liabilities). Symbolically, the upper limit on self- finance is S.1 , and 
Ii 
s. 
the corresponding lower limit on external finance is 1 - .2:. the lowerI. 
]_ 
Pli 









I.= investment of spending sector i 
1 
Si= saving of spending sector i 
Pli = issuance of primary debt of spending sector i 
P . = holding of primary assets of spending sector i
a1 
F. = holding of indirect assets of spending sector i 
1 
and by definition ·- I. + P . + F. 
1 ai 1 
4Plus net foreign investment (small for Japan) and statistical dis­
crepancy (also small, ¥979.0 billion cumulatively for 1954-1967). 
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These maximum and minimum limits of external financing of investment by 
sector are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Maximum and Minimum Limits of the External 
Financing of Investment, 1954-1967 
(in percent) 
Gross Investment Net Investment 
Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum 
Corporate 138.0 33.3 236 .0 57.6 
Personal 78.3 -108.4 151.4 -126.4 
Government 39.2 18.5 43.9 20.4 
National Economy 100.1 -1.1 153.0 -1.6 
Any value greater than 100 indicates borrowing (primary security issue) 
greater than investment; any negative value indicates saving greater than 
corresponding investment. For example, at a minimum one-third of corporate 
sector gross investment was financed externally, and at a maximum it all 
was, while in addition financial assets were increased (by 38 percent of 
gross investment) by borrowing. The upper and lower limits are at a lower 
level for the government sector than in some other countries, but consider­
ably higher for the corporate sector. 
Another measure of the degree of reliance upon external finance for 
the economy as a whole is the ratio of the sum of the cumulation of the 
absolute value of the annual saving-investment gap by sector to twice the 
t i I(Ii - Si) I 5 
cumulated total investment, e.g., The corporate2LI 
t 
5
rf all investment were self-finance, Ii - S. = 0 , then the ratio would 
be 0; if all investment were externally financed, 1 the ratio would be 1. 
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sector consistently invested more than it saved between 1954-1967, the per­
sonal sector consistently saved more, while the government sector usually, 
but not always, invested more than it saved. The ratio is 23.1 percent. 
This is a minimum estimate of the economy's degree of reliance on external 
finance because it is based on the assumption that all saving in a sector 
is used for self-finance by individual spending units. This assumption may 
be reasonable for the government sector, (which I regard as a single, homo­
g8neous, decision-making unit), though of course central government does 
finance local government and government corporations. But in the corporate 
and personal sectors there occurs both direct intra-sectoral lending by 
surplus to deficit units (such as trade credit, stock purchase of related 
firms, or individuals lending to unincorporated enterprises or to relatives 
to finance housing investment); and inter-sectoral lending, either direct 
(trade credit) or through the financial system (some individuals depositing 
at banks, others borrowing from the banks). In other words, even within a 
surplus (deficit) spending sector there are likely to be individual deficit 
(surplus) spending units. Further sectoral disaggregation would result in 
a higher estimate of the minimum share of external financing of investment. 
In practice it is unlikely that any spending units behave according 
to either of the extreme hypotheses underlying Table 2. (I suspect that 
they think more in terms of first using saving, rather than primary debt 
issue, to finance investment, while recognizing that internal sources are 
completely inadequate to finance desired expansion). Firms and individuals 
desire to increase both their real capital stock and their portfolio of 
financial assets, and to do so are willing both to save and to borrow. The 
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problem is to determine whether there are stable behavioral patterns which 
determine choices among these alternatives, to specify them, and to measure 
them; however, that task is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The degree of reliance upon, of utilization of, financial intermedia­
tion depends both upon the preferences of spending units and the availability 
of finance. The external financing of a deficit spending unit by a surplus 
spending unit can occur in three ways: direct borrowing (issuance of primary 
securities) by deficit to surplus units without any intermediary; sale of 
new primary security issue, notably stocks and bonds, to spending units 
through financial markets, involving intermediation but no creation of in­
direct claims; and investors borrowing from (issuing primary securities to) 
financial institutions, which make payment in their indirect liabilities 
either directly or by exchanging those liabilities for the cash of surplus 
spending units. 
Of the total increase in primary claims the financial sector absorbed 
almost two-thirds, and the corporate sector slightly more than a third, while 
the personal and government sectors purchased only small proportions, As 
already noted trade credit looms large in the total issuance of primary 
claims and constitutes 90 percent of corporate sector primary assets. For 
individual firms its importance as a source of working capital often ex­
ceeds that of financial institution loans; in order to compete in sales 
no firm could dispense with trade receivables. The financial system's in­
crease in primary assets has been predominantly in loans (80 percent) 
another 12 percent was in corporate and government sector bonds. 
Let us examine the alternative means of external finance. First, 
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the pri~ary claims issues transferred directly from the issuing spending unit 
to a financing sp£nding unit, without recourse to financial intermediation, 
are the following: trade credit, corporate and government sector holding of 
stocks and equity other than stocks (assumed to be in affiliated and sub­
sidiary companies), corporate and personal sector holding of public cor­
poration bonds (such as purchase of Telephone and Telegraph and Japan Na­
tional Railway bonds by users), and government sector holding of government 
sector bonds. The direct financing share of total primary security issue 
between 1954-1967 was 33.7 percent, almost all in the form of trade credit. 
Second, the shire of primary security financing through purchase in 
financial markets (stocks and bonds) by spending units was small, only 3.3 
percent. Almost all (87 peccent) of this was in purchase of new stock 
6
issue. The complete unimportance of organized capital markets as a mechan­
ism whereby son~e srending units rather directly financed others is somewhat 
surprisirg even thou:;h the small reliance on stock and bond issue is well 
known. Overall, stock and bond issue comprised only 16.1 percent of pri­
mary security issue. Of this,2.8 percentage points was directly placed, 
3.3 percentage points sold to other spending units through the capital 
markets, and 1O.O pe:rcentage points purchased by financial intermediaries 
(not alwc:::,s willingly). The generally unattractive pegged yields on new 
bond issues have restricted demand. The system of issuance of stocks at 
par rather than market, corporate tax advantages for interest relative 
to divident payments, and corporate policy of fairly high dividend rates 
6As noted in thP. appendix, stock is valued at issue price rather than 
subsequent nnrket price because this represents the funds issuing corpora­
tions re,::.;~ive..:1 and buyers paid. 
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relative to par, all restrict the supply of new stock issue. 
Third, external finance by financial intermediaries has been of domi­
nant importance; they provided 63 percent of all the external funds obtained 
(net primary securities issued) by spending units between 1954 and 1967. 
Financial institutions financed these asset holdings by issuing their own 
indirect liabilities to spending units (and themselves). About one-fifth 
of the increase in financial system liabilities consisted of money, and 
another two-fifths of time and savings deposits; insurance, 7.6 percent of 
the total increase, was in third place. Layering (the proportion of total 
indirect claims held by financial institutions themselves) amounted to 14.6 
7percent. The main components of layering have been private financial in-
stitution purchase of long-term credit bank bonds, Government Trust Fund 
Bureau loans to government banks, Bank of Japan loans to commercial banks, 
and call loans. 
III. Characteristics of the Japanese Financial System 
This description of the relative importance of financial intermedia­
tion in postwar Japan has concentrated mainly on a quantitative delimita­
tion of the alternative sources of financing investment, and particularly 
on the importance of external finance and financial intermediation. We 
need to consider also the role of external finance from the viewpoints of 
the three spending sectors. Before turning to that--and then only in a pre­
liminary way--it is desirable to appraise, or at least to suggest hypotheses 
7Layering and total indirect security issue are slightly understated 
because certain transactions among financial institutions--notably between 
agricultural and other credit cooperatives and their prefectural and na­
tional institutions--have been netted out in the flow of funds data. 
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about, the characteristics of Japan's financial system. 
The most important feature of Japan's financial system is that most of 
its components are in disequilibrium most of the time; it is a disequilibrium 
system. By this I do not mean simply that the dynamics of rapid growth, and 
the considerable cyclical fluctuations in growth, sharply and repeatedly 
alter the desired optimal po~tfolios of real and financial wealth so that 
the system is never in static or dynamic equilibrium, though this is true. 
Rather, a structure of interest rates has been imposed by the monetary au­
thorities (including the government), and on the whole supported by oli­
gopolistic financial institutions, which results in demand for credit in 
various forms greater than supply. Financial institutions cannot borrow 
as much as they want at given interest rates from (surplus) spending units; 
investors (deficit spending units) cannot borrow as much as they want from 
financial intermediaries. Since the price mechanism does not clear most 
Japanese financial markets, 8 the system relies importantly on credit 
rationing; for many types of financial claims it is availability rather 
than the interest rate which determines the allocation of credit. This 
situation results from the fact that in Japan's rapid-growth economy~ 
ante investment has tended to be greater than ex ante saving. While 
availability (credit rationing) dominates interest rates as the mechanism 
for financial allocation more in Japan than in other countries, I suspect 
that in the actual dynamics of rapid growth in many countries--developed 
8A number of grey market practices, such as under-the-table additional 
interest payments on large time deposits, have naturally developed but they 
are not sufficiently large to achieve equilibrium in most financial mar­
kets. See H.T. Patrick, "Interest Rates and the Grey Financial Market in 
Japan," Pacific Affairs, Winter 1965-66. 
I 
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and underdeveloped--credit availability rather than cost is considerably 
more important than usually recognized. 
The relative importance of rationing versus market (flexible interest 
rate) mechanisms of determining the flow of financial claims varies con­
siderably by type of security. The interest rate on virtually all indirect 
securities is fixed; financial institutions scarcely use price competition 
at all in trying to attract asset holders to hold their liabilities. In 
other words there is no flexibility in price competition; what price com­
petition exists comes from differences in maximum rates by maturity or 
type. 
The maximum interest rates on bank and postal short-term, time and 
savings deposits and trust deposits are relatively low and almost completely 
unchanging; they have been the actual rates. Even financial institution 
stock, the price of which is market-determined, has been constrained by 
restrictions on dividend pay-out rates. The only indirect claim which has 
had its yield determined primarily by market forces is call money. Even 
it is not fully market-determined since the Bank of Japan directly if in­
formally influences movements in the rate in tight money periods, notably 
in 1967-68. Moreover, entry into the market, either as lender or borrower, 
is restricted to financial institutions, 
Primary security issues on the whole are influenced somewhat more by 
interest rates and market forces, but far less so than in most other in-
dustrial countries. Stock prices are fully market-determined, 9 but as 
9Though there may be imperfect knowledge, manipulation, high trans-
actions costs, and other practices which make the market imperfect. 
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noted the historical institutional convention of issuing at par rather than 
market and differential tax treatment of interest and dividend payments make 
stock issue a relatively expensive source of corporate funds. The demand 
a~.d supply of foreign loans are equilibrated in foreign markets; however, 
the Japanese government restricts private and government entry both as 
demanders and suppliers. 
The most important market sources of spending unit external funds are 
loans from private and government institutions. Government loans are typi­
cally at uncompetitively low rates in order to encourage certain specified 
activities; demand far exceeds supply so that credit rationing is fully 
operative. Government loans comprised 16.5 percent of the total net in­
crease in loans between 1954 and 1967; of these 39 percent went to the 
government sector, 43 percent to corporate business, and 18 percent to 
the personal sector. 
Some market-determined flexibility in effective interest rates exists 
for private loans, but not sufficient to equilibrate demand with supply 
completely except perhaps in very easy money periods. Maximum legal inter­
est rates on loans determine de facto nominal rates which are maintained 
by ccrtel arrangements through bank national associations. These rates 
move in small amounts with changes in the Bank of Japan discount rate, 
insufficient to provide much flexibility in nominal rates. Effective 
interest rates on loans are somewhat more flexible because of the wide­
spread use of required compensatory deposits (kosoku yokin, including 
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buzumi and ryodate). 10 This enables banks both to raise effective rates and, 
more important, to discriminate among borrowers of different risk classes by 
effective interest rate differentials rather than simply by credit rationing. 
This function of kosoku yokin is desirable, because otherwise financial in­
stitutions would have no incentive to lend for riskier but potentially 
highly efficient and profitable investment activities. However, the ac­
tual differential application of kosoku yokin has apparently been primarily 
between large and small borrowers. Existing effective interest rate dif­
ferentials greatly exceed the differences in creditworthiness as measured 
by actual loan losses. Even with high effective interest rates on loans 
to small borrowers their demand for funds tends to be greater than supply 
(for any given risk category); in the rationing of credit, small firms are 
discriminated against, even though it is more profitable to make loans to 
them, This is because city bank, long-term credit bank, and trust bank 
policies are to lend primarily to large borrowers even though it is less 
11profitable. In general, it is the availability of bank loans, rather 
10The amount of kosoku yokin overstates both loans and time deposits 
of commercial banks; no adjustment has been made in the tables above. Ap­
plying the Ministry of Finance's somewhat low estimates of kosoku yokin 
rates as of May 1968 for city banks, local banks, mutual banks, and credit 
associations corporate deposits as of March 1968 indicates that on average 
(weighted) about 10 percent of total deposits, and 20 percent of time de­
posits, are an overstatement of actual effective loans and deposits. 
11
This poses a major problem for analyses based on the assumption of 
bank profit-maximizing behavior. I am attracted to the theory of Professor 
Suzuki Kinzo (in his Ginko Kodo noRiron)that city banks try to maximize 
market share (loans or cteyosits), subject probably to a profits constraint. 
also find attractive Professor Komiya's theory that an important objective 
of management is to develop and maintain stable and close relations with as 
many large, prestigious corporations as possible, in order to provide job 
opportunities for senior management upon retirement. A more accurate 
characterization of financial institution lending behavior is probably 
I 
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than their cost, which constrains demand to the amounts banks are able to 
supply. 
There is even less flexibility in the interest rate on government in­
dustrial, and bank bonds and government short-term securities. The coupon 
interest rate and the issuance terms are in effect fully controlled. Inter­
est rates are low relative to loan and call money rates; moreover, they 
moved seldom and only slightly over the past decade. Most bond issues have 
been forced upon financial institutions--it is one of the prices they have 
had to pay for government cooperation in other areas. To prevent discrepan­
cies between fixed issuance yields on new bonds and freely market-determined 
yields (at higher yields and lower prices) on already issued bonds it has 
been necessary to restrict the development of a real bond market. It has 
informally but effectively been made clear to financial institutions, which 
hold almost all bonds not directly placed, that they are expected to hold 
newly purchased bonds to maturity, rather than sell them in the open mar­
ket. The Bank of Japan has in effect intervened to peg the price of 
national bonds since they are held by individuals as well as financial 
institutions. Since 1967 there has been some trading in bonds and changes 
in yields, particularly for long-term credit bank debentures. The only 
Footnote 11 continued 
in terms of different credit risk categories rather than borrowing firm size, 
though the two are highly correlated. If financial institutions divide bor­
rowing customers into, say, three credit categories of prime risk, inter­
mediate risk, and higher risk, they may well behave as risk averters by
fully supplying prime borrower demand for credit at all times and at rela­
tively low effective interest rates. In contrast, the highest risk category
is almost always subject to credit rationing despite high effective rates 
(and higher profitability after considering actual losses and associated 
costs). Whether credit rationing prevails for the intermediate category
depends upon the general ease or tightness of credit. 
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debentures which have been traded freely over a long period of time are 
Telephone & Telegraph discount bonds {dendensai) sold to users at the time 
of telephone installation. Given the tight controls over the bond market 
it is not surprising that bonds have been only a negligible source of 
spending unit external finance. 
Trade credit is arranged directly between borrower and lender con­
commitant with sales transactions, so it does not go through an organized 
financial market, Data are not readily available on the structure of 
effective interest rates on trade credit or on the use of flexible changes 
in effective interest rates as an equilibrator of changes in supply and/or 
demand. Presumably demand and supply are equilibrated not so much by ef­
fective interest rate changes as by agreement based on purchase and sale 
amounts. Even so the extension of trade credit maturities beyond "normal" 
length by strong borrowing firms versus weak sellers constitutes an impor­
tant mechanism for passing on the burden of a tight money period. Once 
again it is availability that counts. 
The interest rate structure--with the exception of call money and 
dendensai rates--·has not changed much over the course of the business 
cycles of the past fifteen years even though there have been major shifts 
in both supply and demand schedules for financial claims. Consequently 
the excess of demand over supply has fluctuated substantially, being 
greatest in the late stages of a boom and early stages of the tight money­
induced recession, and least in the bottom phase of recession and begin­
ning phase of the next boom. In brief periods of easy money the financial 
system's structure of interest rates may have been determined by market 
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demand and supply; most of the time, however, rationing and direct controls 
have been highly influential in financial markets. 
IV. Criteria of a "Good" Financial System and Japan's Performance 
There are numerous criteria for a "good" financial system. Six impor­
tant criteria are listed below, together with a general assessment of the 
performance of the Japanese financial system in terms of these criteria. 
1. To provide the means of payment (money) cheaply, efficiently and 
elastically in order to satisfy the transactions demands of the economy 
consonant with overall economic policy objectives. 
Japan has had a very elastic supply of money, well m8eting transac­
tions and liquidity demands. The means of effective payment for transac­
tions is only moderately efficient however, since payment by check, giro 
transfers, or bank credit cards are scarcely used at all by individuals 
and small businesses. The time spent in making payment by curre~cy is 
excessive and involves external diseconomies, exemplified by the mid­
month and month-end and year-end scurrying around, and resultant traffic 
jams, to settle accounts. In addition large banks have hired a dispro­
portionate share of the country's best university graduates and kept them 
too long in such menial tasks as counting money and door-to-door solici­
ting of deposits. 
2. To raise the saving rate and to mobilize the savings of surplus 
spending units by offering a wide spectrum of financial claims--differing 
in liquidity, maturity, risk, yield and special service characteristics 
(such as insurance)--to satisfy the v~rious demands of savers. 
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Japanese financial institutions do indeed cffer a wide rcnge of indirect 
securities to assetholders and have well mobilized the saving of surplus 
spending units. Nonetheless, while the financial system does exist in com­
plex and manifold form, more important in the mobilization of saving are 
the facts that individual saving in Japan has been such a large proportion 
of disposable income; that individuals have pYeferred (or have been con­
and that the corporatestrained) to hold financial rather than real assets; 
sector has desired to hold indirect securities in addition to money. The 
supply of indirect securities has followed the demand of assetholders. 
It is difficult to judge the extent to which the activities of the 
financial system have enhanced the saving rate in the econo:",y. By and 
large I regard it as presenting an opportunity rather th:m a direct cs.use. 
Probably not much of the major increase in the saving ~ate of individuals 
or the total economy since 1953 can be attributed to i::ipro-.rcments in the 
con­financial system; on the other hand the saving rate would have been 
siderably lower if the financial syste7Il had r..ot been able to increase the 
supply of safe, liquid indirect securities uadE.r co~:ditions of reasonable 
price stability. Indeed, certain defic.ienci'.~s of the fin3LCii11 syotefl 
may have raised the saving rate, notc'.bly of those \\ho Wcmted to mr1ke lur.:py 
expenditures and hence became tc1.rget savers. Fin2.ncial inte:cmcdi::-xies 
have not made much credit available for purchase of consm1er durables, the 
higher education expenses of an individt•al, or housinB. Lack of avail­
ability and high cost of credit to small busin2ss, unincorporated and in­
corporated, plus high profit opportunities, have provided incentives to 
self-finance by increasing saving. This argu~e~t should not be pushed too 
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far, since it implies that all investment should be self-financed to maximize 
the saving rate. 
3. To allocate funds efficiently for growth by meeting the lending 
needs (i.e., purchasing the primary securities) of a wide spectrum of good 
borrowers (deficit spending units), through differentiation of primary se­
curities in terms of risk, yield, liquidity, maturity. It is particularly 
important that long-term investment demand be adequately financed. In this 
way the financial systems lengthens the maturity of primary claims, over-
comes indivisibilities, provides diversification, and reduces risk by pooling-­
thus intermediating between the different liquidity and risk preferences of 
savers and borrowers. 
It is extremely difficult to appraise empirically the efficiency of 
finance in determining the size and pattern of investment, particularly 
since wo do not know in concrete detail what constitutes the most efficient 
investment pattern for Japanese growth. In a very crude sense we must say 
that the Japanese financial system has been extraordinarily successful: 
economic growth has been rapid, the contribution of investment to growth 
has been important, external finance has been vital for corporate invest­
ment. The financial system has discriminated against the financing of 
consumption, of the production of many consumer personal s~rvices, and of 
housing investment in favor of private business fixed productive invest-
12. h . 1 . 1 .ment wit its ow capita -output ratio. In a high aggregate demand 
12
The system has discriminated against small business despite its 
even lower capital-output ratio. Whether this was harmful to growth can­
not be answered until the relationship of technological induction and 
innovation by scale of firm has been adequately analyzed. 
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economy this has promoted growth,though at some expense in welfare per unit 
of growth. 
More empirical research on the efficiency of financial system alloca­
tion among alternative industries is needed. So-called "key industries" 
have been financed adequately, in substantial part by government financial 
13
institutions, Mr. Kosai's study indicated that rapidly growing industries 
did indeed obtain a rapid growth of external financing as compared with more 
slowly growing industries, but the cause and effect relationship remains 
somewhat unclear. 
4. To maintain efficient, closely interconnected financial markets 
whereby changes in supplies of or demands for certain primary or indirect 
securities can quickly be reflected in the prices and/or yields of all 
securities. This can be achieved either by sufficient overlapping of 
specialized financial institutions' activities along the spectrum of 
alternative securities, or by a number of financial institutions which 
operate over a wide range of the spectrum (such as mixed banking). 
Japan has a relatively wide range of financial intermediaries well 
covering the spectrum of risk and maturity of primary security issue. 
Early postwar Japanese government policy was to continue the development 
of a series of specialized financial institutions differentiated by type 
of indirect claim issued, type of customer (both borrower and saver), 
and/or maturity, with relatively little overlap. Gradually commercial 
banks have come to operate over a wider range of the spectrum, a favorable 
13Y. Kosai et al., "Shikin Haibun Mechanism no Kento," Keizai Geppo 
(Economic Planning Agency, July 1964). 
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development which probably should be encouraged further. Moreover, groups 
of financial intermediaries of different types--such as a city bank, trust 
bank, insurance company, long-term credit bank, and correspondent local 
banks--coordinate their lending to individual borrowers to provide both 
short-term and long-term loans. The inefficiency in the system lies not 
in a lack of institutions, or an undue degree of risk avoidance, but in 
the restriction of the market mechanism due to controlled interest rates. 
5. To protect the financial system against the risks of sharp changes 
in assetholder portfolio preference, default, and debilitating inflation. 
a) Sharp shifts in portfolio preference, notably increased demand 
for money and decreased demand for deposits, can lead to liquidity crises 
and monetary panics involving loss of confidence and bank runs. This prob­
lem is most appropriately met by a central bank as lender of last resort; 
the social cost of bearing this risk is negligible while the benefits of 
panics foregone are very large. Where capital markets do not operate well 
and financial institutions (notably banks) are to be encouraged to have an 
asset portfolio of much longer average maturity than liabilities, assurance 
of central bank willingness to discount a wide range of securities in a 
crisis is vital. 
b) Default risk due to the bankruptcy of an individual financial 
institution is important not only because of the effect on depositors but 
the impact on assetholder confidence in the financial system. The cost 
of default risk to holders of financial institution liabilities is ap­
propriately borne by them, through deposit insurance schemes and regula­
tion and inspection provisions (though these services can probably be 
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best supplied by government agencies, with costs borne by the benefi-
• 
ciaries). A further question is whether society (through the central bank) 
should bear part of the default risk of individual financial instutions, 
and especially of large business borrowers from these institutions. This 
is particularly important in highly leveraged situations such as in Japan. 
When the socially optimal degree of risk-taking for growth is greater 
than that dictated by the private market mechanism (usually the case), 
then it is desirable for the central bank to absorb part of this risk. 
c) Protection of the financial system against erosion due to sub­
stantial, sustained inflation depends upon the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, While theoretically it is possible to devise a financial system 
impervious to inflation (through price index pegging of the nominal prices 
of financial assets and liabilities and their returns), in practice this 
has been seldom achieved. Virtually all financial claims other than stock 
have principal value and yield set in nominal terms. Inflation is a com­
petitive alternative to finance. 
The Japanese system is well protected against risks of monetary panics 
and of default. The Bank of Japan operates effectively as lender of last 
resort. All large financial institutions are in fact guaranteed against 
risk of bankruptcy: the Bank of Japan, concerned over the impact on public 
confidence, will undoubtedly rescue any financial institution in risk of 
default and bankruptcy with massive loans. This includes even the major 
security brokerage firms. It has also supported the stock market when 
prices declined sharply, and presumably would do so again in the future. 
Because large corporations are typically such large borrowers from 
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financial institutions (relative to the net worth of each), the Bank of Japan 
also in effect absorbs a substantial portion of their risk of default. This 
guarantee does not extend to smaller borrowers. Probably the assurance that 
bankruptcy due to illiquidity is highly unlikely has been an important en­
couragement to large corporate enterprises to undertake new, risky invest-
. 14ment proJects. 
While consumer prices have risen at 5-6 percent annually for the last 
decade, this has not been sufficient to arouse widespread distrust of the 
financial system, to discourage spending units from demanding indirect 
claims. Apparently liquidity and safety of principal nominal amount domi­
nate yield considerations for most individuals within the range of rate of 
inflation of the past decade. The demand for money and deposits (including 
time and saving deposits) appear to be rather inelastic to nominal and real 
(price-deflated) interest rate yields within the range that has prevailed. 
6. To be an effective vehicle for fiscal and monetary policy. The 
financial system can normally handle the technical financial side of fiscal 
policy fairly easily since the central bank usually acts as agent on behalf 
of the government and since government debt is regarded as the most risk­
less of all domestic primary securities (this does not hold for certain 
local governments and perhaps certain government corporations). An effec­
tive monetary policy requires the timely knowledge and will of the monetary 
authorities to use their instruments of control, and the rapid and substan­
tial impact of changes in financial assets and debts on real expenditures 
14Management has been constrained from taking on as much risk as possible
by the knowledge that in event of failure or even serious difficulties 
they will be replaced at the instigation of financing institutions. 
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on goods and services by spending units. 
Because of strong private aggregate demand until the 1965 recession, 
the government did not have to rely upon deficit financing substantially, 
so that its demands upon the financial system for the implementation of 
\ 
fiscal policy have been relatively limited in amount. Yet the demands in 
terms of the implications for the rigidity of the interest rate structure, 
and for the ways in which monetary policy is implemented, have been severe; 
and they have existed for the entire period, not just since 1965, The 
government insistence on pegging the rate on government securities while 
assuring a market for them has meant that all other bond rates had to be 
pegged as well--with the result that the bond market is virtually non­
existent. In recent years the Bank of Japan has had to purchase government 
bonds as interest rates firm up in order to peg their price. This could 
undermine a tight monetary policy; thus far it has not been a really seri­
ous problem because the Bank can adjust down its large portfolio of loans 
to commercial banks. More important, government pressure to constrain 
call money increases in the 1967-68 period of restriction seriously under­
mined the effectiveness of monetary control. 
Once the Bank of Japan has decided to implement a restrictive monetary 
policy, it has been quite effective in reducing (the rate of growth of) 
corporate and personal expenditures, mainly by restricting inventory in­
vestment, but also business fixed investment. However, the Bank of 
Japan's implementation of monetary policy does not rely primarily upon 
the cost effect of interest rate changes; rather it depends upon ration­
ing, of both its own credit to the financial system and city bank and 
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other large bank loans to business. This is both a cause and consequence 
of having a disequilibrium financial system. In the very short run the. 
Bank of Japan cannot restrict its supply of credit to borrowing banks be­
cause that might produce a liquidity crisis at daily closing; the Bank has 
not seized the opportunity at such times to use the cost effect of interest 
rates by imposing very high marginal interest rates on loans to banks. 
The Bank of Japan's system of rationing the availability of credit 
worked well until the 1967-68 period of restriction. Then the pressure 
to keep call rates low meant that lenders in the call market made loans 
directly to business instead; the Bank of Japan's mechanism of direct con­
trols extended over an insufficient portion at the financial system. The 
Bank of Japan was saved by the unanticipated surge of exports over the 
period which obviated the need for a really tight money policy. 
Some Further Thoughts 
The above discussion does not go very far in making precise the nature, 
much less the quantitative estimation, of the internationships among macro­
financial and real variables for Japanese growth. He need an integrated 
theory which is both applicable to Japan and empirically testable. The 
most sophisticated approach would be a good macro-econometric model, but 
there are real problems of specification. We are dealing with dynamic 
growth, not stable equilibrium. I am not convinced that Japanese spend-
ing unit, or financial unit, behavior over the past fifteen years is 
appropriately characterized as engaging in saying, investment and finan­
cial flows primarily in order to achieve equilibrium desired stock levels 
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of capital and wealth. Indeed, I am not sure that Japanese spending units 
think in terms of adjusting to equilibrium growth rates of desired capital 
and wealth. I suspect that desired stock positions have been altered by 
the unexpectedly rapid growth and by cyclical fluctuations. It may be 
preferable simply to concentrate directly on the explanation of flows, 
with causal factors other than desired equilibrium stock positions rela­
tively more important. 
I am concerned about the direction of causation between real and finan-
cial variables, particularly in a disequilibrium system in which rationing 
rather than prices clear the market. In a market system, the net issuance 
of primary securities would depend on spending unit investment, saving, and 
its desire for liquidity (indirect assets) and primary assets. In the most 
simple case of self-finance P = f(I - S); where saving is divided among1 
investment and increase in financial assets, then P = f(I, F, Pa), per­1 
haps in the form 
The interest rate enters indirectly, in explanations of I , P , and F. a 
Both F and P (mainly trade credit) can be regarded as depending mainlya 
on increase in sales (0), so that 
However, in an availability system of credit rationing, the causal order may 
be reversed: the level of investment is determined by the availability of 
funds (demand for primary liabilities). In such a case, with the marginal 
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efficiency of investment considerably above the effective market interest rate 
but credit not available, spending units try both to increase their own 
saving and to minimize the holding of primary and indirect assets. Thus, 
I= f(P1
, S) and the demand for financial assets (F + P) is an inversely
a 
related function of the gap between desired and actual investment at the 
given effective borrowing rate. In an availability model we must concentrate 
much more upon finance supply functions and allocation procedures. Whichever 
the case--interest cost or credit availability as a determinant of invest­
ment--any comprehensive theory of finance must be integrated with a theory 
of investment and saving, 
To do so we need to disaggregate into relatively more homogeneous 
sectors; indeed much research has already been done. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore the theories of business~ personal, or 
government financial behavior, but some general comments are warranted. 
Individuals have had a strong preference for financial assets rela­
tive to capital goods (due in part to lack of housing finance). Among 
financial assets, they apparently have a strong preference for safety and 
maintenance of nominal value of principal (risk aversion, as evidenced by 
preference of one-year time deposits to shares with relatively little 
price fluctuation and higher yields), aversion to extreme illiquidity 
(unwillingness to hold bonds--or money in trust--with higher yields than 
one-year time deposits), and where willing to bear risk in financial as­
sets it is mainly in stocks in expectation of capital gains rather than 
dividend yield. Convenience of location and other financial services are 
also important. 
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Analysis of the financing of personal sector investments makes clear 
the heterogeneity of the sector. Housing investment has been fairly large 
despite the scarcity of housing mortgage funds and their high cost from 
private sources. Farmers have been able to finance agricultural invest­
ment rather readily from agricultural cooperative and other local finan­
cial institution loans, in addition to government agricultural financial 
institutions loans on preferential terms. Agriculture is one sector where 
demand and supply of private funds are equilibrated by market forces be­
cause of the existence of specialized financial institutions and because 
of the tendency for farmers to save more than they invest. Least is known 
about the financing of unincorporated business investment. The organized 
financial system discriminates against it, so financing must come either 
from internal sources or direct borrowing from relatives,• friends, and 
moneylenders. 
The corporate sector should be disaggregated further, at least into 
large firms with highly diversified stock ownership and others. Most 
large firms are not solely interested in maximizing profits. Ownership 
and control are sufficiently separated that management has its own ob­
jectives, such as growth of the firm, relative ranking in the industry, 
and leadership. Profits are one among several goals, or may be viewed 
as a constraint: some minimum rate is required in order to quell stock­
holder and lending financial institution discontent. Similarly because 
management has less interest in maximizing the present market value of 
the firm a la Modigliani-Miller, it is not indifferent to alternative 
forms of raising capital; indeed it regards stock issue as the most 
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expensive source of external funds. (One question is why such firms issue 
new shares at all. I suspect it is a combination of (a) pressure by lend­
ing institutions and the Ministry of Finance, concerned about minimum net 
worth ratios, and (b) some rule of thumb reasoning by management that it 
is natural to increase stock issue every few years as total liabilities 
and profits rise. 
The substantial increases in both indirect and primary assets, as well 
as investment and saving, by the corporate sector, are impressive. Primary 
security issue by the corporate sector to finance investment and increases 
in financial assets is large indeed. The minimum reliance on external 
finance of investment (given in Table 2) is high. Corporate primary asset 
holding is almost completely in trade credit, while stock and bond holdings 
are predominantly in related firms; the reasons for this pattern are 
straightforward. The increases in indirect claims, notably money and time 
deposits need further, detailed analysis. My view is that money is for 
transactions purposes, has been already economized upon, and hence is rela­
tively interest-inelastic. Corporate time deposits are explained by a 
mixture of motives: liquidity and timing inbalances between receipts and 
expenditures; precautionary balances built up in easy money periods when 
additions to loan balances are readily available and spent in tight money 
periods when net additions to loan balances are difficult to obtain; and 
required compensatory balances (kosoku yokin). 
The financial side of the government sector is perhaps somewhat less 
interesting. The government, given its system of receipts, disbursements 
and banking at the Bank of Japan, and its ability to create money, has no 
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need for liquidity. Its holdings of both primary and indirect claims are 
1 . 'bl 15 issuance of primary securities is for two quiteneg igi e. Government 
distinct purposes: to finance deficits generated by fiscal policy in 
periods of insufficient aggregate demand; and to obtain private saving 
to finance government investment in a full employment economy. The for­
mer case--of excessive private saving relative to investment demand--has 
generally not been a problem in postwar Japan; private demand has been so 
strong that the government has not required a vigorous deficit-financed 
aggregate demand policy. Hence it has not needed to issue primary securi­
ties for this purpose in any quantity except in 1965-66. 
Even in a full employment economy it may be desirable for the govern­
ment to compete with private investors for private saving as an alternative 
to raising public saving by taxation. This too the Japanese government has 
not done to any great degree; in the competition for resources it has de­
ferred to business fixed investment. Thus, while engaging in 27 percent 
of gross domestic investment between 1954 and 1967, government sector saving 
was 22 percent of total saving, and primary security issue only 11 percent 
of the total net increase in primary securities. In the case of the govern­
ment sector, neither availability nor cost of funds has to be a direct con­
straint upon investment: it is omnipotent relative to the financial system. 
Its constraints are political and bureaucratic. Policymakers have to de­
termine the relative share of government in total resources, and the ex­
tent to which the government's expenditures will be financed by taxes or 
15This is especially true if the "other" indirect claims are ignored; 
this is a mixed bag of transactions with government financial institutions 
and various balancing accounts, with little economic meaning. 
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by primary security issue. Bureaucracy exerts power not only by its recom­
mendations on these issues, but also by supporting certain rules of thumb 
("taxes no more than 20 percent of national income," "the government's 
prestige suffers if it has to borrow at an interest rate greater than 7 
percent, 11 etc.). 
One final comment. By the six criteria listed earlier Japan's finan­
cial system ranks rather well. This is supported by the substantial degree 
of financial institution purchase of primary securities and issuance of 
indirect liabilities. However, the basic strength of the financial system 
lies in the high rate of personal saving, personal sector preference for 
financial assets, and the high rate of desired investment by business. It 
would have taken a very bad financial system not to have intermediated 
actively between the two. 
Appendix on Data 
This appendix describes the methods by which the estimates in Table 1 
and in the text were prepared. Essentially I have relied upon the official 
national accounts of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the flow of 
funds data of the Bank of Japan (BOJ). 
The basic national accounts source was EPA, Annual Report on National 
Income Statistics, 1968 (Tokyo, 1968) and BOJ, Research Department, Keizai 
Shobumon no Toshi Chochiku to Shikin Kabusoku (July, 1968). The latter 
contains detailed calendar year data (1957-1967) for the corporate and 
personal sectors not published in the National Accounts Statistics, as 
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well as the calendar 1967 estimates. Calendar year estimates are not avail­
able separately for corporate and personal sector investment components 
for 1954-1955; these were estimated by applying the appropriate fiscal year 
ratios to the calendar year data for the private (corporate plus personal) 
sector. For 1954-1955 dwelling depreciation was attributed 90 percent to 
the personal sector and 10 percent to the corporate sector (based on 1956 
and 1957 ratios), and damage was distributed among corporate, personal and 
government sectors in proportion to their respective depreciation allowances; 
the amounts are small. 
The flow of funds estimation method does not perfectly match that of 
the national accounts. There are minor differences in sectoral definitions. 
Flow of funds is on a cash basis, national income on accrual basis; use of 
calendar year data overcomes the fiscal year difficulty that certain 
government budgetary disbursements carried over to April or May are in­
cluded in the previous fiscal year in the national accounts but in the 
current fiscal year in flow of funds. The mnj or difference lies in the 
treatment of the net sale or purchase of land and used capital goods. 
These transactions are excluded from investment and saving flows, but are 
included in financial transactions. Due mainly to land purchase, the 
statistical discrepancy between the investment-saving gap and the finan­
cial surplus or deficit has been negative and increasing over time for 
the corporate and government sectors, and positive and increasing over 
time for the personal sector. Thus the sectoral discrepancies noted in 
Table 1 are smaller than they probably should be. 
The main adjustments in the flow of funds data involved the 
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inclusion of government financial institutions in the financial sector, and 
local government and public corporations in the government sector; grossing 
of items netted out in sectoral columns; separation of certain row items 
into their primary and indirect claim components; estimation of foreign 
assets and liabilities by sector; adjustment for minor differences in as­
set and liability valuation of certain claims; and adjustment of the 
''others 11 item in the classification of financial assets and liabilities. 
Flows over the period 1954-1957 were estimated as the difference between 
assets and liabilities outstanding on December 31, 1967 and December 31, 
1953 (the first year end for which flow of funds data are available), ex­
cept for foreign borrowing and lending. 
Most intra-sectoral financial transactions among financial institu­
tions are netted out in the flow of funds data. I have made gross esti­
mates to the extent that the sub-sector detail in the published flow of 
funds data allow, with the exception of money supply in order to maintain 
the standard definition of money. Gross estimates are provided for call 
loans, government financial institutions loans to each other (notably 
Trust Fund Bureau loans to government banks), private financial institu­
tion loans to each other, and to some extent interfinancial institution 
time deposits and money in trust. Agricultural cooperative and credit 
cooperative deposits at their prefectural federation institutions and 
these in turn at the central level remain on a consolidated basis. 
The flow of funds column and row classification intermingles certain 
primary and indirect securities. Public corporation bonds (mostly pri­
mary securities) include some issued by government financial institutions 
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(indirect securities); I arbitrarily assume that one-half of the latter 
amount outstanding is owned by other government financial institutions 
(Trust Fund Bureau mainly) and the other half by private financial insti­
tutions--and none by spending units. Government short-term security issue 
includes Foreign Exchange Special Account bills (indirect securities); 
assume they are all held by the Bank of Japan. The stock and equity other 
than stock of spending units are primary, of financial institutions are 
indirect. I assume that the latter are all held by the corporate and per­
sonal sectors in proportion to their total respective holdings of stock; 
financial institution other equity is distributed to the government sec­
tor as well. Loans of both private and public financial institutions in­
clude loans to financial institutions (indirect securities) in addition 
to loans to spending sectors. In the process of including loans on a 
gross rather than net basis the indirect security component was estimated 
separately. 
The estimation of foreign flows is more difficult because of lack of 
published Bank of Japan stock data. Foreign exchange was taken from pub­
lished year-end stock figures, the Bank of Japan's holdings estimated from 
its published balance sheet, and the remainder attributed to the govern­
ment foreign exchange special account. The annual foreign loan flows by 
sector can readily be estimated from annual flow data in the flow of 
funds accounts. The 1953 stock figures are my own rough estimates; the 
1967 stock is derived by adding the 1954-1967 flow to my 1953 stock esti­
mate. The data are somewhat rough because of changes in measurement and 
definition which may not show up fully in annual flow data (for example, 
I 
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inclusion of the gold tranche in foreign exchange reserves was not reflected 
in foreign exchange flow of funds data). The flows between Japan and the 
rest of the world are of the correct order of magnitude. 
I value stock issue at purchase price since my purpose is to analyze 
sources and uses of funds by sector, and since this procedure reflects the 
funds actually received by issuers. There remains a small difference in 
stock valuation, as total stock assets are slightly greater than corporate 
and financial institution stock liabilities. The difference is added en­
tirely to corporate liabilities on the assumption that stockholders ac­
tually paid the amount their records show, while part of the proceeds went 
into corporate capital surplus accounts. There is also a minor difference 
in government securities; liabilities are slightly greater than assets. 
Some bondholders evidently purchased their bonds at prices below par. 
Since redemption is at par, assets of each sector of bondholder have been 
increased, in proportion to the share of total government bonds, to in­
crease assets to the level of the bond liabilities. 
The "others" category by sector is a residual of all other financial 
accounts. As such it is a hodgepodge. It also contains all foreign 
assets and liabilities in stock data, as well as reflecting change in 
method of data. In the processing of making all the adjustments above, 
fould that "other" assets did not exactly equal 11other 11 liabilities, 
usually being larger, and that the financial sector consistently had an 
"others" liabilities position while spending units had an "others" as 
an indirect security (issued by the financial system and owned by spend­
ing units), to reduce the asset total to the smaller liability estimate, 
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and to distribute it among spending sectors in proportion to their initial 
relative shares of 11 others11 assets. This seems preferable to leaving out 
the "others" category altogether, though it does seem to distort govern­
ment sector indirect asset holdings substantially. 
In summary, the flow of funds data are some-what incomplete for my 
purposes. Indirect claims among financial intermediaries remain on a 
less than fully gross basis. The personal sector is insufficiently homo­
genous, and needs to be further disaggregated. Direct financial flows 
within the personal sector are not estimated, so it is impossible to ob­
tain a quantitative picture of the unorganized financial market. Deposits 
of individuals -with employer corporate enterprises are included among 
"others" for both; this is a small but not insignificant item. Corporate 
and unincorporated business holdings of time deposits and hence amount 
of loans are overestimated because of financial institution requirements 
of compensatory deposit balances. There are other minor problems: 
securities companies are included in the corporate rather than financial 
sector because of lack of data for the early years; and the economic mean­
ing of the "others" items for financial analysis is unclear, though prob­
ably unimportant. 
